The New “Primary Colors:” why Democrats may need to learn to love an “open” convention.

Photo by Sharon McCutcheon on Unsplash

When I began my odyssey in election-year prediction in August 2019, I was convinced that the key elements of US economic and policy elite were willing to allow a shift in the center of gravity of US politics to the Center-Left. They would do this if they concluded they had to to build an electoral coalition broad enough reach out to voters outside of the top 10% in income and wealth. To do anything less would be to leave these folks politically homeless and allow the the forces of Right-Nationalism that had transformed the Republican Party to squeak through to another electoral college victory. This narrow victory would be even easier for the Right-Nationalists if enough economy-minded upper-middle class suburban voter were willing to vote for President Trump in the general election. The trouble for the Wall Street and Beltway crowds, and the academics and journalists who provide much of the intellectual weight behind elite opinions, is that the Right-Nationalist coalition is willing to back Trump even as he unravels the key underpinnings of the rule-based international order. This rule-based order has underpinned US dominance of the international system since the 1940s and is an important source of legitimacy for an economic system that has so disproportionately benefited those around the world with the educational and financial resources to capture the benefits. The largest concentrations of these folks in the United States are on the “coasts.” The key question then is this: to what extent is the US branch of this elite willing to make domestic compromises in order for its “trusted hands” to remain in charge of foreign affairs and foreign economic policy?

On the eve of the South Carolina primary and Super Tuesday, my predictions are proving durable. Over time, I downgraded the likelihood of a Center-Left victory to less than 50/50, because I saw a higher degree of hostility from pundits and online commentators towards the so-called “progressive” candidates, Senators Sanders and Warren, than was evident last summer. In addition, I predicted that impeachment would be a failure and that the Right-Nationalist coalition would retain its hold on the Republican Party and unite around President Trump. Now, I have updated my predictions only slightly since the last time I published in January. They are now (expressed in probabilities of my three scenarios coming about and showing changes since January):

• Center-Left Coalition (44%) (minus 1)
• Radical Middle Breakout (8%) (plus 1)
• Right-Nationalist Coalition (48%) (even)

My updates are based on my weighing of the following pieces of evidence.

1. The strength of the Center-Left is sapped by elite fears and short term economic factors. So far, the two progressive candidates look to outperform my expectations that they would receive 40% of votes cast in the Democratic primaries. There looks to be no clear path to a successful Democratic nomination that does not include compromise between Centrist elements and the Left. The trouble is that electoral strength on the Left is panicking the establishment. While the establishment may not be able to stop a Bernie Sanders nomination, it still has the power to create enough pessimism about the ticket that victory in November effectively will be handed to President Trump. Moreover, the US economy appears to be picking up steam in the short run even while longer-term prospects in 2020 are being downgraded on fears that the Coronavirus outbreak will slow growth in East Asia and as a consequence, Europe, Australia and the rest of the world. The US is relatively isolated from trade and its fiscal and monetary policy mix continues to be widely expansionist, all of which will help Trump’s re-election prospects. Thus, on balance the strength of the Left in the primaries is outweighed by evidence that enough of the elite may settle for the unhappy status-quo of Trump over the radical uncertainty of a Presidential campaign conducted under a more comprehensive version of a Center-Left shift.
2. Bloomberg’s entry creates a plausible path towards a Radical-Middle Breakout but this scenario remains highly unlikely. Mayor Bloomberg’s entry into the race has upset the balance between liberal centrists and progressives among the declared Democratic candidates and among primary voters. Mayor Bloomberg has baggage that will weigh down his candidacy in the general election. As nominee he will be viewed with hostile skepticism by a broad swath of Center and Left elements in the Democratic coalition. His well-publicized association with stop-and-frisk and past troubles with “bad jokes” will open him up to effective attacks aimed at readily-identifiable sub-groups in the electorate. Thus even if Bloomberg’s nomination is seen as reasonably possible (i.e. much more than the 1/30 chance currently predicted by fivethirtyeight.com), the chances that Bloomberg can win as a Radical Centrist (govern as a technocrat, no broad promises to address inequality or build a bottom-up approach to combatting climate change with public infrastructure investments and a commitment to “green” jobs) remains only slightly higher than I predicted for that scenario a month ago.
3. In this current populist moment, Democrats have no political language that can salvage a decision on a nominee at a brokered convention other than the candidate who won the plurality of delegates. Even with his strength coming out of the early primaries, Senator Sanders chances of winning a majority of first-ballot votes at the convention is still seen as well less than 50/50. The likelihood of another candidate reaching that level is even less. That means that there is nearly a 50/50 chance that there will be a decision on the nominee that will emerge from bargaining prior to the convention or even at the convention itself. These scenarios will not necessarily deliver a result that will be seen as legitimate by all those whose views on its legitimacy matter for the success of the ticket in November. A Center-Left alliance requires both the Center and Left to buy-in. If Sanders is nominated, it will likely be because powerful non-progressive forces have been convinced that he can win and govern effectively in their interests. If Sanders is too weak to be nominated, then the mainstream party will need to forge a deal that brings as many progressives into the fold as possible. My belief that such a an alliance will be a challenge for Democrats to forge in the harsh light of mid-summer Milwaukee compels me to reduce the likelihood that such a scenario comes to pass.
4. Trump’s continued weaknesses will weigh down his re-election prospects. For the President’s re-election prospects not to be helped by the evidence that a Center-Left alliance will need to be brokered around the national nominating convention and nor by the clear weakness in the Center of the primary field revealed by Michael Bloomberg’s late entry into the race, there must be something happening on the Republican side that weakens the Right-Nationalist alliance. I see evidence that there is something like that happening. President Trump has emerged from his battle with impeachment only because the Republican Senators fear their political lives without Trump more than life with Trump. HIs approval numbers, after showing a bounce, have now settled back into patterns that reflect historic lows for a sitting President. Moreover, there are visible strains in the Trump coalition. Trump’s attacks on his own Department of Justice appear to be making Republicans nervous. His Secretary of State gave a saber-rattling speech in Europe recently that revealed how far the foreign policy views of the palace guard diverge from those of the President on important topics like relations with Russia and China. There are clearly cracks in the facade. What could make it finally crumble and make a second impeachment attempt a viable option cannot be predicted, but it remains an option especially if it allows for re-consolidation of the administration around an interventionist foreign policy advocated by many former “neo-cons” who have rebranded as “never-Trumpers.” But in the face of this evidence of forces that could lead to chaos and instability, I am reluctant raise or lower the likelihood of the President’s re-election without more. This instability raises slightly the likelihood that a Democratic nominee could succeed in creating a narrow victory without the Left. That is reflected in the rise in the likelihood of the Radical Middle Breakout, without making it probable at this stage.

In summary, the “New Primary Colors” are red, green, pink, blue and yellow representing various factions — Red for economic progressives, green for environmentalists, pink for social movement activists, blue for party regulars and yellow for neoliberal Centrists. Given this fractionalized picture, it looks like the Democrats are much more likely to either find themselves with a nominee that makes the powerful elites who also distrust Trump nervous, or to face the unenviable task of selling the result of a brokered convention to a skeptical electorate. The success of the various forces in the Center and Left to coalesce will depend on the emergence of leaders who can frame a new language to sell the resultant compromise as a shining achievement of healthy democratic institutions channelling the popular will. If that is to happen, the work needs to start now.

*****

The types of evidence I announced in August I would rely upon are as follows:

The type of evidence that increases the likelihood of a successful Center-Left Coalition (CLC) would be: (i) good performance by Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders in early primaries, especially among voters in areas that supported Trump in 2016 and especially in purple states that could influence the electoral vote; (ii) continued indulgence by elite editorialists of the policy “excesses” of leading candidates as not undermining their ultimate “reliability” (in the minds of the business and the meritocratic classes) as they are clearly obligated to try to steal Sanders’ thunder in the primaries; (iii) re-emergence of unemployment and other serious domestic economic worries; (iv) continued stability in the Trump coalition making creation of the broadest anti-Trump coalition necessary.

The type of evidence that increases the likelihood of a Radical Middle Breakout (RMB) and its ultimate victory would be: (i) poor early primary performance of Sanders, Warren and (after her attempted take-down of Biden) Harris; (ii) continued strength in the Biden candidacy; (iii) surprise emergence in the primaries of a reliable “moderate” Democrat (Klobuchar, Buttigieg, Booker, Bennet or O’Rourke) who can attract voters initially in Biden’s camp without promising “shiny objects” to the Left; (iv) intensifying the campaign in the elite media and among the pundit-class generally about the dangers of too much “socialism” and the risks of a Center-Left electoral strategy specifically; (v) erosion of generalized elite support for Trump due to scandals and/or international crises or embarrassments; (iv) evidence emerging over the primaries that a significant segment of voters is sufficiently radicalized or disillusioned to make it unlikely that they would vote in the general election for the moderate Democrat who appears able to win the nomination. All these would make a bet on a more narrow Democratic coalition seem smart or at least smart-ish.

The type of evidence that increases the likelihood of a Right-Nationalist Coalition (RNC) victory would be: (i) no economic surprises and no surge of unemployment; (ii) no scandals or international crisis or embarrassments that make Trump look like a poor bet; (iii) outbreak of open conflict between Center and Left elite and activists as reflected among Democratic candidates and wars of words around issues of economic populism and privilege; (iv) a galvanizing national emergency that allows Trump to look like a successful leader.

These categories of evidence still seem to me to be the correct ones (albeit with an updating to account for drop-outs and additions to the pool of candidates running for the Democratic nomination). I welcome comments on suggestions on how to tweak my model to make it more useful and accurate.