The Case for a Center-Left shift has weakened

Photo by Jason Leung on Unsplash

When I began this experiment in prediction in August 2019, I believed that the most likely scenario to emerge from the 2020 election would be the shift of American politics to the Center-Left. I saw this a as a way for internationally-minded elites to dump Trump and shore up the rules-based-international order. The coalition would unite traditional business leaders with scientists, environmentalists and other academically-trained experts who understood that in order to win in a two-party system with an electoral college, substantial efforts would need to be made to address the sources of anxiety suffered by people in the lower 80% in socio-economic terms: health care, stagnating living standards, immigration, automation etc. I saw the way that ideas coming out of the Sanders campaign and left-wing proposals for a Green New Deal seemed to be establishing the talking points for the campaign agenda of most Democratic candidates. Moreover, legions of credentialed experts seemed to be on hand to validate the case for these far-reaching proposals. Climate change and inequality were the challenges of our time and a rising chorus of voices appeared to be ready to reassure the electorate that unconventional times might just call for unconventional politics.

Since then, three things have happened and a whole bunch of other things have failed to happen that could have weakened the Right-Nationalist cause. First, what’s happened?

1. The “electability” issue. Elite journalists and politicos with the power to define in voters minds what is the “Center” of American politics began to panic that the Left-progressive agenda was either impracticable on the merits or, in a more subtle turn, impracticable politically even if the ideas were sound on the merits. The second argument — that the act of running on a platform of ambitious(dubbed “radical”) reforms will strengthen well-funded enemies and provoke pockets of voters with entrenched interests and harm the “electability” of the candidate — is difficult to refute. The “electability” worry can only be de-confirmed by actual votes in actual elections, which is impossible today, because no one has actually caucused or voted. The problem is that whether or not this worry will turn out to be decisive, its endless repetition creates an impression, especially among high-information voters most likely to support Elizabeth Warren, that continued support for “radical” ideas is not “smart.” And high-information Democrats will do almost anything to avoid appearing “not smart.” Hence the break on the Warren surge and the curious stability of Biden and the emergence of Buttigieg and Klobuchar as “serious” candidates. It also gives credence to the candidacy of Mike Bloomberg, who is spending gobs of money to appear to be the only credible alternative for the “broad middle” sick of Trump.
2. Impeachment helps Trump. This I argued in one of my prior articles in this series. Impeachment is not likely to convince Republicans of the need to dump Trump, making the likelihood that the Senate will remove him from office extremely remote. Also the focus on Ukraine and Biden has two negatives for Democrats. First, it puts a national-security Cold-War frame around politics that makes many voters nervous, doesn’t reflect the views of many traditional Democratic voters and takes the focus away from domestic issues. Second, it invites Republicans to repeat a counter-narrative that leading Democrats under prior administrations were corrupt, a story which many, especially non-elite, voters instinctively credit as legitimate. The polls on impeachment and removal have largely supported worries about the political consequences of an unsuccessful impeachment effort.
3. Iran Crisis Won’t Hurt the President in 2020. As I write this, it appears that the President and his team are downplaying the seriousness of Iran’s retaliation for the killing of General Soleimani, which seems to signal their intention to ratchet down escalation. If the crisis does not widen into a general war in 2020, the President will be helped. The fact that it might further undermine the US position as leader among key allies and rivals is irrelevant as these shifts will worry elites but not be visible to the voters and therefore also not relevant in the 2020 election. If there is a wider war and US casualties, it could drive down Trump’s support among ex-Democrats in swing states. But I view this as not likely. I hope I am not wrong about the risk of the wider war.

So what has not happened? The economic weakness and “global risks” that leading manufacturing companies talk about in their quarterly conference calls are not having severe effects on overall hiring or consumer confidence in the US. In fact there may have even been some improvement in conditions and sentiment now that it is less likely that brinksmanship with China will result in an all-out trade war. Yes, the Trump Administration has de-fanged the World Trade Organization (WTO), meaning that the institutional structure of the liberal global trading regime is under mortal threat. The question can be posed whether the Trump position on the WTO is a radical departure or more of the same lack of faith in global institutions that led the Obama Administration to pursue regional trade pacts across the Pacific and Atlantic rather reinvigorate the stalled WTO process. It is likely that history will show that Trump’s retreat from global leadership is part of a longer-term trend, albeit accelerating the shift from multilateral institutions to regionalism and at the extreme end towards bi-lateral reciprocal relations, an obsession among trade specialists that will not move the needle with voters in the 2020 elections. Likewise there has appeared no global crisis (other than Iran already mentioned) that threatens Trump’s standing with voters now inclined to support him.

So my predictions have been adjusted (reflecting changes from my last post):

• Center-Left Coalition (45%) (minus 3)
• Radical Middle Breakout (7%) (plus 1)
• Right-Nationalist Coalition (48%) (plus 2)

Last time I wrote that my predictions would likely not move based only on changes in polls. But the failure of impeachment as a political matter, coupled with the deepening divide among factions of the Democratic Party — as evidenced by the tensions between the candidates and media’s coverage of the race — will strengthen the chances that Trump wins re-election. This likelihood is increasing because factionalism will weaken the energy and unity around the ticket emerging out of the Democratic convention. Thus it is more likely that Trump will win at the head of the Right-Nationalist Coalition than I had thought before. It is also less likely that the Center-Left coalition will form in the way I had predicted, leading to a lower-likelihood of its victory.

But what about the Radical Middle Breakout? Don’t the continued success of Biden’s candidacy and the emergence of Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar and especially the entry of Mike Bloomberg as a potential spoiler mean that the Democrats could nominate a moderate ticket that wins the general election without worry of offending the Left by ignoring its campaign demands and sidelining its leaders? It will all come down to how ex-Democratic voters (and supporters of Bernie Sanders) in a few swing states weigh the sins of the Trump administration against the sins of the established Democrats. I credit the argument that the Democrats can win on the basis of appeals to an alleged voter hunger for “credibility” and “stability” and the potential for a brokered convention where the influence of elected officials and political insiders (the so-called “super-delegates”) will be amplified enough to boost the likelihood of a Radical Middle Breakout by 1 point. Why such a small shift in likelihood? Because ascendant moderate Democrats would have to chart a narrow path between erring on the side of doing too much or too little to woo their more Leftwing activists and voters. National polls today show that Sanders and Warren have the support of 40% of the likely primary electorate, considerably less than a majority in the general election certainly, but a significant block nonetheless. Will more votes be lost among non-elite folks by failing to promote popular proposals like universal health care enthusiastically or among “moderate” suburban voters turned off by Trump but worried about the taxes needed to pay for these proposals? We cannot know for sure, but by the pure power of numbers there are more voters to be gained by combatting Right-Nationalist friendly populism with a form of populism that supports a Center-Left program than upper-middle class voters with demonstrations of fiscal rectitude. Thus it may seem more likely, based on the evidence we have now than what we had in August, that a moderate candidate in the end will win the Democratic nomination and that candidate will not simply endorse the Center-Left platform (after criticizing it all primary season), but the nomination of such an individual will give Trump additional opportunities among key pockets of voters in swing states. As these competing probabilities cancel themselves out, I believe it is prudent to only raise the likelihood of a Radical Middle Breakout one point.

Note on my methods: These are probabilities of a victory scenario coming to pass, not the percentage of the popular vote won by each coalition. The coalitions are not running in the election, of course. The coalition scenarios will instead be what propels a major-party Presidential candidate to victory in the electoral college and sway the results in Senate and House races. In my view, the Democrats retaking the Senate is not necessary for a Center-Left coalition “victory.” Taking the US Presidency and holding a policy-majority in the US House is enough. I recognize that this is a debatable point. If retaking the Senate is required to be counted as “victory”, the chances of a Center-Left victory fall below 50%. The types of evidence I announced in August I would rely upon are as follows:

The type of evidence that increases the likelihood of a successful Center-Left Coalition (CLC) would be: (i) good performance by Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders in early primaries, especially among voters in areas that supported Trump in 2016 and especially in purple states that could influence the electoral vote; (ii) continued indulgence by elite editorialists of the policy “excesses” of leading candidates as not undermining their ultimate “reliability” (in the minds of the business and the meritocratic classes) as they are clearly obligated to try to steal Sanders’ thunder in the primaries; (iii) re-emergence of unemployment and other serious domestic economic worries; (iv) continued stability in the Trump coalition making creation of the broadest anti-Trump coalition necessary.

The type of evidence that increases the likelihood of a Radical Middle Breakout (RMB) and its ultimate victory would be: (i) poor early primary performance of Sanders, Warren and (after her attempted take-down of Biden) Harris; (ii) continued strength in the Biden candidacy; (iii) surprise emergence in the primaries of a reliable “moderate” Democrat (Klobuchar, Buttigieg, Booker, Bennet or O’Roarke) who can attract voters initially in Biden’s camp without promising “shiny objects” to the Left; (iv) intensifying the campaign in the elite media and among the pundit-class generally about the dangers of too much “socialism” and the risks of a Center-Left electoral strategy specifically; (v) erosion of generalized elite support for Trump due to scandals and/or international crises or embarrassments; (iv) evidence emerging over the primaries that a significant segment of voters is sufficiently radicalized or disillusioned to make it unlikely that they would vote in the general election for the moderate Democrat who appears able to win the nomination. All these would make a bet on a more narrow Democratic coalition seem smart or at least smart-ish.

The type of evidence that increases the likelihood of a Right-Nationalist Coalition (RNC) victory would be: (i) no economic surprises and no surge of unemployment; (ii) no scandals or international crisis or embarrassments that make Trump look like a poor bet; (iii) outbreak of open conflict between Center and Left elite and activists as reflected among Democratic candidates and wars of words around issues of economic populism and privilege; (iv) a galvanizing national emergency that allows Trump to look like a successful leader.

I think these categories of evidence are still the correct ones. I would welcome comments on suggestions on how to tweak my model to make it more useful and accurate.